

YouPrev. Delphi Institutional Report – Looking towards the future (WP3)

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1 / Introduction: Aims, context and topics of YouPrev Delphi survey

The Delphi survey aims to collect as much information as possible from the point of view of the participating professionals on the possible scenarios and main problems relating to violence and juvenile delinquency in the near future. Its context necessarily includes those disciplines and areas whose professionals work in contact with children and youth, from the health system to juvenile justice, including education or social work.

To sum up, the main goal of this institutional report is having a portrait of the economic, political and social foreseeable changes, their influence on childhood and adolescence –what might take place as regarding juvenile violence and crime, as well as which trends to follow, both at the political level and for different specific areas of intervention¹. The main topics covered are the result of previous phases of the research project (National Institutional and Expert Survey) and point to the following issues: new technologies, family structures, demography, education, employment, drugs, cybercrime, aggression and use of violence.

The limited number of answers requires the presentation of an eminently quantitative analysis, as the number of participants does not seem to guarantee a reliable quantitative valuation.

2 / Methodology

This summary presents the results obtained after the first two rounds of the Delphi survey² – the third (and last) stage corresponds to the “European” part, which is being carried by a selection of participants from each country. All the participants in the second round had already sent their answered to the first questionnaire, but they are just a small part of those who participated in the first round –see the response rate below:

First round –september, october 2011:

34 answers to 227 sent questionnaires: 15%.

Second round –january, february 2012:

15 answers on 34 questionnaires: 44%.

Final response rate after second round: 6.6%.

The recruiting strategy followed a rough division of potential participants trying to keep a close correspondence with the cast of participants according to areas of intervention³ in the previous Institutional and Expert Survey³.

¹ Find more detailed information in the *sample description*.

² The wording of this summary directly reproduces the main ideas contained in the questionnaire.

³ Although the number of police professionals included in the sample was not particularly high – between 5 and 10%, note that the police response rate for the Delphi survey was 0%.

3 / Sample description

Composition. Professional areas

18 specified among those 15 complete answers after 2nd round:

Social Education (33%)
Social Work (11%)
Primary and Secondary School (11%)
Science, Research and University (11%)
Juvenile Justice (11%)
Health System (5.5%)
Courts (5.5%)
Crime Prevention (5.5%)
Children Rights (5.5%)

4 / Discussion

The main obstacle. Reluctance to predict –“I’ve got no crystal ball”...

Around 30-40% of those professionals who didn't reply the questionnaire in the 1st round (in addition to 20-30% of the ones who did answer) explicitly included statements such as *I am not an expert on prediction / I can't answer to these questions / I don't agree with this method-perspective...* in their answers. This has been the most mentioned obstacle to obtain an amount of answers that could get closer to the required response rate in this chapter of the YouPrev survey: more than 50% of the answers were explicitly reluctant to predict.

This relevant problem undoubtedly brings a necessary argument about the efficiency of “looking towards the future” instruments, and introduces an important bias to take into account in the interpretation of the available data.

Data in first round and questionnaire for second round

As a result of the first round, main general conclusions were the following:

Optimistic views and approaches to opportunities are statistically residual. The general scenario expected by Delphi participants is close to a *worst case scenario*: cuts in public budgets, dismantling of welfare structures and life precariousness for a majority of the population.

“Despite” of the current collapse at a social and financial level (the destruction of the welfare structures is stressed as the main problem), a dramatic rise in delinquency rates is not expected. Crimes against property, violent behavior, drug abuse and cybercrime are the most stressed “specific” types.

Participants in the second round received a summary of the results of the first including new questions focusing on the most controversial issues, as well as some suggestions to expand their vision on the most sensitive issues in the field of juvenile violence. Below (see *part 5: findings*) is a summary of the information obtained in this second round of the Delphi survey.

In parallel with the survey, four interviews were also made to different professionals belonging to four areas of intervention: a teacher (non-formal education), a social educator for a protection “closed” institution, a “street educator” and a lawyer.

5 / Findings

5.1 · Anticipated social changes until 2025

According to most of the answers (see items below), cuts on social public budgets will minimize social intervention until problems related to exclusion and poverty get worse and perpetuate the “administrative limbos” and urban ghettos.

Many of these elements can help increase the visibility, signage, emergency, dangers and threats which are traditionally stressed by the media. In addition to the crisis and the collapse of the welfare structures, more media spectacle about violence will probably tend to reinforce the gap of injustice and inequality.

A reduction in the volume of immigration will focus the approach to problems in the so-called “second” generation of immigrants, with the same urban backgrounds than 10 years ago. A permanent reproduction of profiles reveals that a sort of “social legacy” and a worsening of problems is expected, both in material terms and with regard to coexistence, not only linked to demographic issues (immigration and its implications: “*we must learn from the bad experiences of other countries*”...) but also related to a broader concept of “culture” –frequently focusing on consumption, consumerism, competitive values and violent behaviours.

5.2 · *Anticipated developments in the field of youth crime / youth violence*

The “classic” phenomena will remain public health (drugs) and crimes against property. Unfortunately, violence and crime are often seen, at a certain point, as inevitable. Their effects might be “democratized” and increased, but also could remain stable as it seemed to be happening for the last years –no clear statements available on this topic. Changes in the types of offences committed by minors, especially related by new technologies and the access to them, can lead youngsters to “classic” acts of threat, coercion or aggression but modified in their terms by the mediation of the technology –sometimes youngsters are not aware of that are committing an offence.

No big changes in gender (some of the participants mention a possible increase of violent behaviors amongst girls) or age issues have been specially considered, as the pattern remains basically the same: “essential class-differences, social reproduction of inequality, ethnic minorities and low-class foreign groups, more boys than girls, “multi-problematic” families, people *“in poor areas with resources for poor areas”*. Earlier risk behaviors might be due to an early maturity which can be consistent with the increase in consumerism rather than organized or planned crimes –such as committed by bands or gangs, which are not considered in general as a particularly serious phenomenon.

The main problem that is mentioned in the questionnaire is an apparent generalization of violence which may explain the spread of conflicts in areas such as the family or the school. Victimization will then consequently affect people who are closer to the aggressors, such as family members, classmates or teachers –and normally those who are in a weaker position or show a lower authority.

A punitive increase is expected (we already can see it in the new Spanish government decisions), first letting the social situation get worse and then publishing their measures to give the audience a feeling as if an effective response was being applied. The toughening of criminal laws depends on how effectively widespread is the social alarm, but if there is no money to put those laws into practice, they become useless.

Almost all of the professionals are opposed to such ideas like a possible reduction of the criminal age or an implementation of longer sentences, since they have not shown any utility to prevent violence or crime. Many of the participants also stress the danger of dedicating psychiatric resources to problems that are caused by psychological problems or even introducing the medicalization and treatment with legal drugs of problems whose origin is actually social: *“It is easier to deal with a medicated violent teenager than with a not medicated one. If means are precarious, medicalization will be used”*.

5.3 · Information and communication technology. The changing face of juvenile crime

Among the main key concepts we should highlight, these following four ideas are particularly relevant: “mind the technological gap”; “changes in law to improve crime control vs. skepticism about law” as the key discussion; “technology as a potentially useful tool vs. technology as a mean to commit more sophisticated crimes (harassment, bullying, theft, crimes against intellectual property...)” as the secondary discussion; socio-educative and medical areas as the two main references for intervention; new technologies are seen as a potential problem for youngsters in addition to a potential threat coming from youngsters.

Changes in the law to regulate technological crimes might show a tendency to normalize what is considered as an abuse or misuse of new technologies. Technological development will also give birth to new kinds of crimes. Access to technology is growing at all levels and, therefore, technological crimes may also occur in all levels. In any case, the instrument is less important than the motivation for consumption, and the percentage of young people with access to and management of the technology isn't as high as we can suppose. Technology is only a changing instrument, but harassment already existed and exists. The real change takes place in forms of expressing those relationships.

The perception of those “problems” related to the use of new technologies points to theft (stealing valuable devices to use or sell them, in any case at the inability to acquire those objects which are seen as “essential” by the standard means), crimes against intellectual property or data protection (by widespread ignorance of its implications among young people) or, to a lesser extent, the potential use of mobile phones or social networks to publish scenes of aggression, brag about the commission of abuse or commit “cyber-harassment”. Mentions to cyber-harassment, fraud and child pornography explicitly incorporating the perspective of the child as a victim are not included as a prevalent problem.

Most of the responses point to the risk of addiction (insert, compulsive gambling) and psychosocial consequences derived from media such as the internet (social networks) and any relationship forms associated to this abuse. According to several of the responses, the risk involved in the deepening of the digital gap between classes and generations adds some consequences such as the construction of asymmetric relations, the intensification of intergenerational or cultural conflict. Due to this, psychosocial, educational, family and medical aspects are the most stressed at the level of the solutions. Allusions to “cibercontrol” or the “necessity of new laws” are much less important⁴.

⁴ It should be also noted the frequent mention of issues as the social alarm, its power to oversize the identification of the problem... and, in the opposite direction, the prediction of increases in certain forms of abuse (*harassment, bullying*) against peer and the use of terms as *blackmail, extortion*... in some (but less frequent) responses.

5.4 · **Controversial issues**

The majority of replies to the three points of this chapter show clearly that professionals avoid the technical or specific dimension of interventions and approaches of their respective disciplines, mainly focusing on main structural, political or socio-economic issues⁵.

5.4.1 · **Family cohesion / changes in family structures**

“The weaker families are (when parents don’t have a social network to support them), the more serious is the damage for their children”.

Tensions and conflicts between the economic model in process, the protective role of the family (as a central space of primary prevention) and the lack of protection provided by the State are the common places obtained from responses at this point.

The importance of the family as a guarantee for prevention is mentioned either in propositional terms and as a warning of the (nominal) relationship between the families and the problem of juvenile delinquency: *families are still a central element in the development and social participation of children, even though they lost some weight in the transmission of values in favor of other socializing agents.*

Thus, if the family is understood as desirable reference for measures of *economic and affective support*, the context of crisis (unemployment, wage reduction, unprotected) is described as *the collapse of networks and services that guarantee coverage of rights* and this crisis is seen by our respondents as the main source for life precarity and a higher erosion of domestic coexistence.

Some other particular allusions point to “lack of authority” among the families, inner lack of communication (due or related to new habits and technologies), and ambiguous statements stressing *the importance of early intervention in order to prevent antisocial behavior...* frequently related to the social/financial elements exposed. Lack of responsibility of parents (who think that educate his son is enough to take care of him) is often noted. *“Knowledge is acquired in school but education needs more time and dedication from the family”.*

The analysis of the socio-economic context is almost unanimous, but conclusions differ significantly: some opinions link this trend to an expected *increase in the so-called crime* among young people; in the opposite direction, some others stress that *statistics prove that previous times of crisis didn’t register any increase in crime.*

⁵ See chapter 2 –‘prevention in concrete areas’.

5.4.2 · Demography / culture / social gaps / urban distributions

“Events occurred last year in France are an example. Immigration came later to Spain, but development and policies carried out, we can get the same results”.

The ageing of the population and “*adultocratic*” character of our society focus on youth and, thus, problems in the specific profile of the “young foreigner” (no matter if he was actually born in Spain or not) and in the idea of “gang” (no matter that gangs actually represent a minor problem), but they will not necessarily be the ones who increase the level of juvenile delinquency.

Immigration is never a problem itself, and only depending on external conditions (that construct a role for immigration and give it a treatment) immigration can be either an active educative element contributing to a richer social environment or a functional element for social control policies. This duality is well represented in some opposite responses along the survey: “division in ghettos vs. universality of rights”; “criminalization and labelling of urban poor sectors as dangerous classes by mass media and punitive control policies vs. higher investment in reducing the social gap and supporting basic human rights”; “who must get adapted to whom *and* who must get adapted to what”; “penal system as a class-filter vs. social policies for democratic consensus” and “social conflict as a matter of values vs. structural justice and spaces for socialization”.

Emphasizing on socio-economic degradation and claiming the maintenance of welfare policies to support those who mostly suffered the so-called crisis, most of the answers point to the following issues: risk of xenophobia, job precarity, scarcity, unemployment, cut on public funding, political and media tendencies to *link crime to economic migration*, expansion of ghettos (either as racist causes and consequences of the increase in social conflict); the *unjustified police chases* based on racial profiling.

Beyond the ethnic or racial controversial questions, the “cultural gap” is also mentioned as a broader but less valued problem since it’s linked to consumption, consumerism, imposed needs, frustration, success and culture of the image. This often produces a short-circuit between motivation and possession, reproduces social inequality and maintains the values and roles of patriarchy, power, possession, strength, accomplishment...

All these factors are seen as part of the labelling of so-called “inmigrants” as *easy scapegoats* and the overrating of foreign population in the criminal justice system, as noted by some respondents. Referring the consequences of this process and its impact on the young population, the so-(badly) called “second generation of inmigrants” and young immigrants in general are mentioned as direct victims (*the social elevator is detained for young immigrants*), especially *for those who are not supported by a social network*.

According to this perspectives, the mostly mentioned proposal underlines the positive effects of immigration as a factor *which is helping people to learn to live together* (both in schools and to society in general), hence the opposition to policies focusing on reaction to crime. Participants would rather pay attention to *the need for policies and programmes of social integration focusing on this group and on the basic reinforcement of the role of education as a basic element of integration*. Beyond the term “integration”, a certain amount of replies emphasize:

“Not to talk about integration but about inclusion and justice”

and

“Not to talk about compensating inequality but about programmes that truly match all possibilities for a better level of equality”.

5.4.3 · Education, employment and social resources

Privatization policies, competitiveness, precarity, temporality, a “new status of poverty” employment can’t help, cuts on welfare resources and the return of charity are some elements included in the general social portrait anticipated by the participants.

Along with the family (as seen above), the school has been considered as the main area where the expected evolution of the problems of adolescents and young people should be faced by prevention policies. Again, along with the socio-economic conditions (and enabling a desirable improvement thereof), school has been also named as the place for *actions at the level early* or the *basic element for integration, cohesion, correction of inequalities and social promotion*, sometimes adding that *it is not a means of social promotion but a mechanism of social reproduction*, before social differences which *are mainly established on the basis of the economic general conditions*.

Lack of work and unworthy salaries will make people show discontent and this might happen by violent means. If crisis gets longer and young people find more difficulties to access the labour market, problems may arise –especially among youngsters. Theft, robbery with violence or crimes against property in general may increase, *“as it happens among adults (fraud, undue appropriation, insolvencies...) with those criminal acts that minors don’t commit”*. More unemployment, less assistance and more concentration of wealth imply worse conditions for the middle classes and a dramatic impact on the lower classes. Poor children will pay those consequences of institutional neglect and lack of resources that produce worse conditions for the care of minors and perpetuate any problem. That reduction of public resources will be also accompanied by an increase in the informal economy.

“If better times didn’t see an adequate public investment in prevention, protection and reform, this won’t happen from now on”. The dismantling of structures and interventions (especially child protection) can lead every individual to a “save yourself if you can” solution. Minimum attendance gives way to the growth of the *penalfare* and juvenile delinquency is often used to legitimize (fast trials, reduction of the criminal age, hardening of penalties) the performance of the State –control policies recipients (who are also consumers of the society of the spectacle) support these discourses and practices. But the success of juvenile justice depends on law’s implementation, and at the same time it depends on the invested means.

To sum up, some critical elements can be quoted as: *systems are being privatized and competition is the main priority; a transfer is taking place from formal education to non-formal education; “school failure” reveals a “failure of school” as an academic space and basic context for socialization*. Training is claimed as a key (*work helps to prevent exclusion*) but the raise of unemployment is narrowing the spectrum of opportunities for young people and professional/social training is being devalued: *training provides no guarantee of economic stability nowadays*. The distorted role of the media and its product of social alarm affect the alleged *direct relationship between lack of education and crime*.

To complete these last statements, some participants indicate that *the poor are not the most violent and criminal people but their violence is more explicit and exposed by the media*.

The main speech constructed by the sum of responses in this second round can be summed up with this quote: *we are talking about situations in which several variables conform somehow true itineraries of exclusion* – economic regime (crisis), working conditions (insecurity and unemployment), policies on social rights (privatization and reduction), families (impoverishment and inner conflicts), schools (gentrification and segregation), lifestyles (individualization and competitiveness) and consumption habits (frustration).

This seriousness attached to the pathway of exclusion can be summarized with other two quotes: *Social resources seem to be something that took decades to get out of begging and they will get back to this in 15 minutes* and *It seems that we are back to ex-gratia assistance and charity instead of respecting rights*.

5.5 · Preventive approaches in selected fields of juvenile problem behavior⁶

5.5.1 · Substance abuse

5.5.1.1 · In your opinion, whose task should prevention of drug abuse among juveniles be? Please indicate for each of the following institutions/persons to what extent prevention of juvenile drug abuse should be one of their tasks.

Families 42 - very much

School 37 - quite a lot

Health 34 - quite a lot

Social educators 30 - quite a lot

Social services 23 - somewhat

Social work 21 - somewhat

Police 16 - somewhat

Others:

Youngsters themselves (2) - very much (*make them feel responsible and get involved*).

Politicians (1) - very much

Media and public figures (2) - very much

Economic system (1) - very much

5.5.1.2 · Which approaches do you recommend for social work in the field of prevention of drug abuse among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

Community work, based on encouraging youth participation and the role of youngsters as agents of prevention, is one of the most stressed proposals in the field of social work to prevent drug abuse. On the same line, information, prevention and responsible consumption requires a proper level of coordination between all agents and areas to improve training, evaluation and available resources. Supporting comprehensive programmes in depressed areas and focus on vulnerable groups is also seen as a key element, in addition to social-educative work in wide environments as a more general approach.

Some of the obtained responses give a clear idea about how main perspectives on drug abuse prevention are being put in practice as a confirmation of the general *statu quo* of inequality since their basic principles are not universal but specifically focused on poor areas and groups.

Nevertheless, medical intervention and socio-educative programmes are seen as much better known than regular criminal justice measures.

⁶ The two first items (5.5.1 and 5.5.2) were already included in the European Survey as common topics for the studies that have been carried out in the 6 countries. The third item (5.5.3) responds to the point of view expressed mostly in the first round.

All 15 respondents' valuations on every item were given a number (at all = 0; somewhat = 1; quite a lot = 2; very much = 3) and then added to calculate the final result: 38 to 45 = very much; 23 to 37 = quite a lot; 8 to 22 = somewhat; 0 to 7 = at all).

5.5.1.3 · Which approaches do you recommend for police in the field of prevention of drug abuse among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

Common and specific intervention protocols are seen as a necessary element.

Some participants also ask police forces to focus on big supply and money laundering instead of criminalizing minor crimes, a question that involves directly the role of media: *“Stop selling ‘retail-crime’ operations as great ‘cover news’ by the media and prosecute huge economic offences”*. In addition to that, prevent against privatization of public spaces and simply comply with legislation are two of the underlined tasks police would be supposed to carry out.

No agreement can be found on the appropriateness of the contact-collaboration between police and social workers/educators or about the necessity of having police officers in schools or educative spaces. Nor is there agreement about the specific appropriateness of their role: *“control both consumption and truancy vs. police is one of the main factors in the construction of juvenile delinquency”*. Nevertheless, beyond the dilemma about coordination between professionals or the different roles they should play in every prevention area, the common place for many answers here is a necessary training of police officers to deal with special problems and apply the law *without adding violence to violent situations* – giving an efficient response to crime but also treating young delinquents as youngsters in trouble.

Some ambiguous responses (*“more severe penalties”*) are especially difficult to read since they seem to forget that penalties and legislation are not police’s jobs.

5.5.2 · Youth cybercrime

5.5.2.1 · In your opinion, whose task should prevention of youth cybercrime be? Please indicate for each of the following institutions/persons to what extent prevention of cyber offences committed by young people should be one of their tasks.

Families 42 - very much
School 37 - quite a lot
Social education 29 - quite a lot
Police 27 - quite a lot
Social services 17 - somewhat
Social work 15 - somewhat
Health 9 - somewhat

Otros:

Law and cybernetic systems (1) very much

Media (4) very much

Politicians/legislators (2) very much

Again: *‘make them feel responsible and involved in the solutions’*

5.5.2.2 · Which approaches do you recommend for social work in the field of preventing cybercrime among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

Preventive policies for a better education to citizens since birth are given priority on current preventive policies for young people. These second ones are seen as repressive policies, and respondents prefer an extensive work on education from early childhood (*“or even earlier with future mothers and fathers”*), promoting better social respect to labour and intellectual property as the basis for the prevention of future offences, as well as advising, accompanying and training youngsters, families, educators and other social agents in the use of ICT in order to avoid a digital gap that might enforce social exclusion.

Training and information are seen as the most useful tools to prevent cybercrime. Their targets are both youngsters and families, and the digital gap is supposed to be the main problem to work on. As some answers show, minors are even sometimes seen as potential victims (rather than potential delinquents) and media are therefore seen as an obstacle to develop a proper treatment for violent youngsters.

5.5.2.3 · Which approaches do you recommend for police in the field of preventing cybercrime among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

Specialization, training or collaboration in broad, multidisciplinary and universal initiatives are the key concepts for police in this area. The main proposed tasks are: in one hand, advising, detecting, informing young people, families, schools; in the other hand, searching for better means to control dangerous or criminal activities on internet in general and social networks in particular. Regarding to this topic, a particular discussion faces these two views together: *“less tolerance for offences against intellectual property vs. leave the discourse that directly associates ICTs to crime”*.

Some include the police as a part of training and prevention programmes, even in schools and educative spaces, but some refer to *“their (police officer’s) job”* as special investigation, mainly focused on financial crimes, money laundering, pedophilia networks... rather than having to participate in those spaces and tasks which are supposed to be filled by professionals of education.

As we saw above, some ambiguous responses (*“more severe penalties”*) seem to forget that penalties and legislation are not police’s specific jobs.

5.5.3 · Aggression and violent crimes

5.5.3.1 · In your opinion, whose task should prevention of aggression and violent crimes be? Please indicate for each of the following institutions/persons to what extent prevention of violent offences committed by young people should be one of their tasks.

Families 42 - very much

School 38 - quite a lot

Social educators 36 - quite a lot

Social services 30 - quite a lot

Social work 29 - quite a lot

Health 24 - quite a lot

Police 21 - somewhat

Otros:

Media (3) very much

Justice system (1) quite a lot

5.5.3.2 · Which approaches do you recommend for social work in the field of preventing aggression and violent crimes among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

Community and intergenerational work is still the main proposal, also in this field. Work with families, skills training, conflict resolution and mediation are seen as the best resources for prevention from social cohesion. To do so, general plans for systematic awareness-raising are preferred to specific technical projects. *“True”* integration is closely linked to a wide concept of social justice more than to specialized interventions, though effective intervention and empirical evaluation techniques are also well valued.

A couple of responses are given with a slight idealistic tone ("*values, values and values... values and social skills*"), and some others talk ambiguously about "early intervention" without specifying its level (general, special...) or even what is that earliness exactly needed for. There is also a certain contradiction between the "official reasoning" and the "effectiveness of measures". First: "social justice" is pointed as the ideal (and idealistic) reference; second: "education and community work" (supporting families) are stressed as the main preventive keys against violence; third: "values" are apparently considered as the core of educative work.

5.5.3.3 · Which approaches do you recommend for police in the field of preventing aggression and violent crimes among juveniles in the time frame until 2025?

More presence on the streets and a more effective deterrent function (both for preventive control and faster responses), victim assistance and monitoring-accompaniment are the main tasks allocated to the police by the participants.

At the same time, they also note the need to improve aspects such as taking care of their image, dealing with respect (either to victims or aggressors), avoid discrimination, avoid the use of violence, "*lead by example*" or "*avoid meeting violence with violence*".

More coordination and collaboration with other areas is also significantly noted in some responses, but there is still no agreement on the desirability of the collaboration between police and education (see 5.5.1.3).

What to expect?

As the current tendencies clearly show, resources for primary prevention will keep on being reduced (*"there is almost no preventive work today"*) and social work will get minimized back to charity and pacification, acting on symptoms and not on basic problems, while criminal laws and police control is reinforced.

We can expect more violence in some particular terms and expressions (statistically, not for a rise of the most dramatic ones but as a spread of "daily violence"), because *"ignoring violent processes (by exploiting the show business and focusing on most serious acts) leads society to reproduce and spread problems"*.

Drugs are one of the elements taking place in this process: *"there will be more drugs, in part as a result of medicalization and as a means of control"*.

Most of the participant's expectations about the future of juvenile violence and crime point to the main tendencies that shouldn't be followed from their point of view:

What should be done? What shouldn't be done?

"Less technocracy and better training for children's social environment". Socializing problems is considered as the best methodology for a preventive strategy, and this means supporting work with families without replacing or emptying them, only to educate and help them solve their (economic, social, affective...) problems by themselves. Education and prevention are undoubtedly the two key words a majority of participants mentioned in their answers.

"It's all about giving people chances. If they spend all day in the street, the street is a bitch. It's about filling the free time and feeding illusion for something. Always from the public sphere, because private projects are welcome but you cannot rely on them".

"We should avoid doing nothing. Doing nothing is getting nothing. What is already being done is not bad but it's not enough".

Any tendency to not seek the resolution of conflicts through mediation or to vertically resolve conflicts by resorting to violence should be avoided. Participants opt mainly for mediation, extrajudicial restitutions, a higher participation of minors in the processes and a better considered role for experienced professionals in political decisions.

Public policies should avoid any contribution to reproduce violence and replace special measures of control by general and primary prevention measures. Since juvenile delinquency is not a problem that can be taken as an independent phenomenon apart from economy, education, society or culture, professionals should avoid the "scientific" perspective that faces this problem as an isolated object and escape from hardening the laws, trying not to trial any problem –because sometimes the contact of the aggressor with the victim or his/her own environment is enough to solve it.

This last proposal is closely linked to the critique raised to a market of multidisciplinary intervention which is seen, basically, as *"a business on the outside misfortunes"*.

7 / References

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Annex / Post Scriptum. A short and 'relevant' quote about new technologies:

The criminal expertise of young people who have been tried and sentenced by juvenile courts during the recent years is very crude and poor except for rare exceptions, which implies that it is not likely in the next few years to reach the level of specialization that cybercrimes require to be committed.

(...) My answers are the result of passing through different areas of professional activity: I started as an educator in a juvenile justice center, then worked as a member of the technical staff for juvenile centers (including penal area), head of the children service (also including the juvenile justice area), responsible for planning and programming in the organization of the system of juvenile criminal justice, coordinator for professional training and responsible for implementing the measures set out by the court of minors, juvenile delinquency research, (all of the above in Asturias), member of the "interdepartmental" technical commission for the ministry of social affairs in the field of juvenile justice.

In his reply, this *specialist* in juvenile delinquency doesn't refer to young people but to the "young criminals" as a specific, delimited, partial and tagged sector that is not only attributed the monopoly of current aggressions but also the potential commission of "new" crimes.
